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“I CAN DO IT MYSELF”—AN ANALYSIS OF WHETHER
COMPETENCY TO REPRESENT ONESELF AT TRIAL IS A
“RESTORABLE RIGHT” WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF
INDIANA V. EDWARDS
Emily L. Barth*

I. INTRODUCTION
For almost fifty years following the Supreme Court decision in Dusky
v. United States, the legal definition of competency has remained the
same. 1 However, in the 2008 decision Indiana v. Edwards, the Supreme
Court indicated that a distinct standard of competency is required for
defendants who wish to proceed as pro se litigants. The Edwards Court
declined to specifically define what the distinct standard was, or how it
should be applied, but the Court altered the legal definition of
competency by explicitly indicating that the competency standard for
pro se litigants was different from the Dusky standard. 2
Within the criminal justice system, a defendant’s mental competency,
such as competency to stand trial and competency to plead, can vary
depending on the defendant’s present mental state. For example, if a
defendant is initially deemed incompetent, the defendant’s competency
to proceed can be restored—and the government actively seeks to
restore the defendant’s competency. This Comment argues that
competency to proceed pro se 3 can and should be a restorable right,
especially given that the right to self-representation is a recognized
constitutional right grounded in the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 4
This Comment’s argument is not an easy premise, or one that exists
without tension within both the legal and scientific communities. This is
especially true because legal scholars, including Supreme Court justices,
have called into question whether a right to self-representation in
* Associate Member, 2009–2010, University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
2. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2383 (2008).
3. “Self-representation” will be used interchangeably with “pro se” throughout this Comment.
Pro se is defined as “For himself; in his own behalf; in person. Appearing for oneself, as in the case of
one who does not retain a lawyer and appears for himself in court.” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
712, 1099 (8th ed. 2004).
4. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2383–2384.
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criminal proceedings ever existed at common law. 5 These scholars
challenge the overall holding in Faretta v. California 6 —namely that a
constitutional Sixth Amendment right to self-representation in criminal
proceedings ever existed. Along the same lines, other legal scholars
have actively advocated to overrule Faretta. 7 This Comment, however,
argues that if a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives the right to
counsel and elects to proceed pro se (i.e. legally waives the right to
counsel under the Zerbst provisions), 8 then the defendant, regardless of
mental disability or defect, should be allowed to proceed pro se.
Part II of this Comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s holding in
Faretta v. California and illustrates how a right to self-representation in
criminal proceedings is firmly grounded in the Sixth Amendment. In
Part III, this Comment discusses the legal meaning of “competence” and
questions what it means to be “competent in a court of law.” Part III
structures this line of questioning within the framework of relevant
Supreme Court “competency” case law—through discussion of Dusky v.
United States, Drope v. Missouri, and the “mental competency standard”
as well as through discussion of Godinez v. Moran and “competency to
plead.” Part III then discusses the Supreme Court’s recent holding in
Indiana v. Edwards and applies the standards set forth in Dusky, Drope,
and Godinez in order to understand why the Supreme Court progressed
from a low threshold for measuring competency, to a distinct standard
for determining competency to proceed pro se.
Part IV of this Comment examines in detail the distinct standard for
competency to proceed pro se in a criminal proceeding established by
Edwards, and argues through analogy and other applicable Supreme
Court case law that competency to proceed pro se, as a Sixth
Amendment constitutional right, can and should be a restorable right.
Part IV continues by offering possible safeguards that can be put in
place to assure that defendants are permitted to act in a pro se capacity
only if they have knowingly and voluntarily waived their right to
counsel. These safeguards include special roles for the court, the role of
5. See Brief of the Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Indiana v.
Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008) (No. 07-208); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)
(Burger, C.J., & Blackmun, J., dissenting); Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 528 U.S. 152, 156, 158
(2000).
6. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 806.
7. See generally Reply Brief for Petitioner, Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008) (No. 07208); Robert E. Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 621, 628 (2005);
Martin Sabelli & Stacey Leyton, Train Wrecks and Freeway Crashes: An Argument for Fairness and
Against Self Representation in the Criminal Justice System, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 161, 165
(2000).
8. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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mental health professionals, and the appointment of standby counsel.
As previously recognized, allowing a defendant to stand trial without
the benefit of counsel, especially if the defendant’s personal state raises
capacity concerns, is highly debated. The Court has recognized in
several contexts that “the government’s interest in ensuring the integrity
and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in
acting as his own lawyer.” 9 However, more importantly, the Court has
also recognized that “a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel must
be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood
of the law.’” 10 This Comment argues that it is possible to strike a
balance between these two competing interests, and as such, the
constitutional right to self-representation should be a restorable right.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF SELF-REPRESENTATION
A. Self-Representation Is a Constitutional Right
The history behind the right of self-representation can be traced back
to the Revolutionary Era. 11 In criminal proceedings, the right to selfrepresentation is grounded in an interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment. 12 In non-criminal contexts, the right to self-representation
has also been traced to the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 13 the First
Amendment, 14 the Due Process Clause, 15 and the Equal Protection
Clause. 16 In support of the right of self-representation, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia succinctly stated, “[o]ne

9. Martinez, 528 U.S. at 162.
10. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2384 (2008) (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337,
350–51 (1970)).
11. See JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO
SE LITIGATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS 22 (1998) [hereinafter
MEETING THE CHALLENGE]. Arguing in support of the 1776 Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights,
Thomas Paine said, “either party . . . has a natural right to plead his own case; this right is consistent
with safety, therefore, it is retained; but the parties may not be able . . . therefore the civil right of
pleading by proxy, that is, by counsel, is an appendage to the natural right of self-representation.” Id.
(citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 830).
12. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 806.
13. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. See also Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52, No. 3, 230
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230); Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., 207 U.S. 142 (1907).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See specifically the First Amendment right to petition the
government for redress of grievances. Id. See also California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,
404 U.S. 508 (1972).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
& Brennan, J., concurring). For a detailed discussion of the constitutional origins of the right to selfrepresentation, see MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 11, at 19–24.
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of the basic principles, one of the glories, of the American system of
justice is that the courthouse door is open to everyone—the humblest
citizen, the indigent, the convicted felon, the illegal alien.” 17
The Sixth Amendment does not explicitly recognize a constitutional
right to self–representation in criminal proceedings; 18 however, in the
leading self-representation case, Faretta v. California, the Supreme
Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment encompasses a
constitutional right to self-representation. 19 Acknowledging that the
right to self-representation is not explicitly stated within the text of the
Sixth Amendment, the Faretta Court found that the right to selfrepresentation—and the right to make one’s own defense—is necessarily
implied by the plain language structure of the Sixth Amendment. 20
Citing the specific verbiage of the Sixth Amendment, the Court found
that the right to defend is given directly to the accused “for it is he who
suffers the consequences if the defense fails.” 21 Subpart II(B) analyzes
the Faretta holding and the Supreme Court’s rationale behind
recognizing a constitutional right to self-representation.
B. Faretta v. California—Recognizing a Constitutional Right of Self–
Representation
In Faretta, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a
state may force counsel upon defendants who insist upon conducting
their own defense. 22 Recognizing the complexity of this question, the
Faretta Court built upon several preceding cases and recognized a
constitutional right to self-representation in a narrow and highly
contested 5–4 decision. 23
In analyzing the issue, the Faretta Court found a “nearly universal
conviction, on the part of our people as well as our courts, that forcing a
lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to

17. Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Meese, 615 F. Supp. 200, 205–06
(D.D.C. 1985).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
19. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975). Subpart II(C) discusses the basis for and
implications of the Faretta holding.
20. Id. at 819.
21. Id. at 819–20. The Court continued with the affirmation that “an unwanted counsel
represents the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has
acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the
Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense.” Id. at 821.
22. Id. at 806, 807.
23. See generally id.
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defend himself if he truly wants to do so.” 24 Finding support for selfrepresentation in prior case law, the structure of the Sixth Amendment,
English jurisprudence, and colonial jurisprudence, 25 the Court
recognized a constitutional right to self-representation if the defendant
voluntarily and intelligently elects to proceed without counsel. 26 The
Court grounded its decision by recognizing that “[t]he right to defend is
personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the
personal consequences of a conviction.” 27
Although the majority affirmatively recognized a constitutional right
to self-representation, the 5–4 decision spawned two lengthy dissents. 28
The dissenters espoused their disagreement with the majority stating that
“there is nothing desirable or useful in permitting every accused person,
even the most uneducated and inexperienced, to insist upon conducting
his own defense to criminal charges.” 29 The dissenters also found the
majority’s claim that self-representation is a constitutional right was
unfounded. 30 Perhaps prophetically, in his dissent, Justice Blackmun
posed a series of questions regarding the procedural aspects of a right of
self-representation. 31 Justice Blackmun asserted that “[t]he procedural
problems spawned by an absolute right to self-representation will far
outweigh whatever tactical advantage the defendant may feel he has
gained by electing to represent himself.” 32 Part IV of this Comment will
address some of the procedural problems posed by Justice Blackmun in
Faretta and will offer counterarguments to his dissent. Additionally, it
will offer safeguards that can be put in place to assure that selfrepresentation, while not an absolute right, can be a restorable right in
many instances.
III. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE LEGALLY COMPETENT?
To maintain the validity and integrity of the criminal justice system, a
defendant must be competent at every stage of the criminal justice
process. 33 An accused person’s competency is an issue at various stages
of a criminal proceeding, including for example: (1) competency to
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 817.
Id. at 818.
Id. at 818–36.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 836–52 (Burger, C.J., & Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 836 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 843.
Id. at 846–52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 852.
RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY IN LAW/ LAW IN PSYCHIATRY 171 (2d ed. 2009).
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stand trial; (2) competency to plead guilty; and (3) competency to
proceed as a pro se litigant. The issue of an accused person’s
competency to stand trial—also known as trial fitness—has become one
of the more controversial issues in criminal law. 34 An estimated 60,000
competency evaluations are carried out annually. 35 Part III of this
Comment addresses the Supreme Court’s definition of competency
through a discussion of the Court’s mental competency standard,
competency to plead standard, and competency to proceed as a pro se
litigant standard.
A. The Supreme Court Defines “Competency”
The Supreme Court has held that criminal defendants may not be tried
in court unless they are competent. 36 The word competent derives from
the Latin “competere,” meaning “be fit or proper.” 37 “Competent” has
three common definitions: (1) having the necessary skill or knowledge
to do something successfully; (2) satisfactory or adequate, though not
outstanding; and (3) having legal authority to deal with a particular
matter. 38 The Supreme Court, however, has never specifically defined
how “competency” is to be assessed. Rather, the Supreme Court
established standards of competency through case law. Three of these
decisions are instrumental in understanding the Court’s holding in
Indiana v. Edwards, as well as in determining whether competency to
proceed pro se is a restorable right. These decisions are discussed in
turn below in subparts III(B–C). The Indiana v. Edwards decision and
the standard for competency to proceed pro se is discussed in subpart
III(D).
B. The Mental Competency Standard—Dusky and Drope
The Supreme Court illustrated the Constitution’s “mental
competence” standard 39 in Dusky v. United States 40 and Drope v.

34. Id. at 171.
35. See MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health & the Law, The McArthur Adjudicative
Competence Study, available at http://macarthur.virginia.edu/adjudicate.html#N_1_ (last visited Nov.
15, 2010).
36. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966).
37. Oxford Dictionaries, Competent, available at http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/
m_en_us1234931#m_en_us1234931 (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
38. Id.
39. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2383 (2008).
40. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
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Missouri. 41
In Dusky, the Supreme Court found the previous standard for
evaluating a defendant’s competency to stand trial insufficient, and
therefore established a new two-prong standard. 42 Under this new
Dusky standard, a defendant is deemed competent to stand trial if the
defendant: (1) “has sufficient present ability to consult with [her] lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding,” and (2) “has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
her.” 43
The Dusky standard established a minimal constitutional standard
regarding competency. However, the Dusky standard is vague in how its
two prongs are to be practically applied in court proceedings. The
Dusky standard is even vaguer in that it fails to spell out the exact
meaning of “incompetent.” Fifteen years later, the Court attempted to
clarify the Dusky standard in its decision in Drope v. Missouri.
In a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice Burger, the Drope
Court held that it is a violation of due process to require a person to
stand trial while incompetent. 44 Building upon its earlier decision in
Dusky, the Court again declined to provide a specific definition of
incompetency. The Drope Court affirmed the standard established in
Dusky, and bolstered the Dusky standard by holding that even when a
defendant is competent at the commencement of the trial, a trial court
must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would
render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand
trial. 45
However, neither the Dusky nor the Drope Court considered the
relation of the mental competence standard to the right of selfrepresentation. This distinction played an important part in the Court’s
analysis in deciding Indiana v. Edwards, 46 which is discussed in Part IV
of this Comment.
C. Godinez v. Moran—Competency to Plead
In Godinez v. Moran, the Supreme Court revisited the standard of
competency for pleading guilty and the standard for waiving the right to

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
Id. at 402–03.
Id. at 402 (emphasis added). The Dusky standard is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (2006).
Drope, 420 U.S. at 162.
Id. at 181.
Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2383 (2008).
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counsel. 47 The Godinez Court addressed the unanswered question
regarding whether the Dusky competency standard for pleading guilty or
waiving the right to counsel is higher than the competency standard for
standing trial. 48 The Supreme Court rejected the “reasoned choice”
standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit, 49 and held that competence to
plead guilty and competence to waive the right to counsel is the exact
same standard for competency to stand trial previously outlined in
Dusky. 50
The Court premised its holding on two concepts: (1) defendants are
required to make a variety of important decisions in the course of
criminal proceedings, and (2) competency to waive counsel is different
than the competency to proceed pro se. 51 The Godinez Court recognized
that defendants who stand trial are likely to be presented with a myriad
of choices that require the relinquishment of the same rights as a
defendant who pleads guilty. 52 Noting that “while the decision to plead
guilty is undeniably a profound one,” the Court ultimately determined
that the decision to plead guilty “is no more complicated than the sum
total of decisions that a defendant may be called upon to make during
the course of trial.” 53 Additionally, the Godinez Court found that there
was no reason to believe that the decision to waive counsel requires a
higher level of mental functioning than the decision to waive other
constitutional rights. 54 Also, while there is a “heightened” standard for
pleading guilty and waiving the right to counsel, as the waiver must be
knowing and voluntarily made, “it is not a heightened standard of
competence.” 55
The Godinez Court concluded that requiring
47. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
48. Id. at 391.
49. Id. at 394 (holding that “the state court’s postconviction ruling was premised on the wrong
legal standard of competency” (quoting Moran v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1992))). The
Ninth Circuit continued:
“Competency to waive constitutional rights . . . requires a higher level of mental
functioning than that required to stand trial”; while a defendant is competent to stand trial
if he has “a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings and is capable of
assisting his counsel,” a defendant is competent to waive counsel or plead guilty only if
he has “the capacity for ‘reasoned choice’ among the alternatives available to him.”
Id.
50. Id. at 397–98.
51. Id. at 398–401.
52. Id. at 398. The Court specifically mentioned the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, the right to confront a defendant’s accusers, how to put on a defense, and whether to raise
one or more affirmative defenses. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 399.
55. Id. at 400–01.
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competency of criminal defendants has a “modest aim: It seeks to ensure
that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist
counsel[;] . . . the Due Process Clause does not impose . . . additional
requirements.” 56
Although the Godinez Court determined that a heightened standard of
competency was unnecessary for defendants entering guilty pleas, the
Court adopted a distinct competency standard in Indiana v. Edwards.
D. Indiana v. Edwards—Adopting a Distinct Definition of Competency
for Pro Se Litigants
Indiana v. Edwards involved a criminal defendant whom a state court
found mentally competent to stand trial if represented by counsel, but
not mentally competent to proceed as a pro se litigant. The Supreme
Court considered whether the Constitution forbids a state from insisting
that the defendant proceed to trial with counsel, which implies that the
state could deny the defendant the right to represent him or herself. 57
Ahmad Edwards tried to steal a pair of shoes from a department
store. 58 When a store security officer approached Edwards, Edwards
drew a gun and fired, wounding a bystander. 59
Edwards was
subsequently apprehended and charged with attempted murder, battery
with a deadly weapon, criminal recklessness, and theft. 60 Edwards
suffered from schizophrenia. 61 Edwards’s mental condition, and
whether he was competent to proceed to trial, became the focus of three
competency proceedings and two self-representation requests, spanning
an almost six year period. 62
Almost a year after his indictment, the hospital determined that
Edwards’s condition had improved to the point where he was competent
to stand trial. 63 The trial began almost a year after this determination.64
Immediately before his trial commenced, Edwards requested to
represent himself as a pro se litigant 65 because his attorney had not spent
adequate time preparing the case and because his attorney was not
56. Id. at 402.
57. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2381 (2008).
58. Id. at 2382.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2382–83.
63. Id. at 2382. This competency determination was made about eight months after Edwards’s
recommitment. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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sharing legal materials with him. 66
Edwards also requested a
continuance in order to prepare his pro se defense. 67 In addition,
Edwards filed a number of incoherent written pleadings, but he also filed
several “intelligible” pleadings, such as a motion to dismiss counsel, a
motion to dismiss charges under the state speedy trial provision, and a
motion seeking a trial transcript. 68 The trial judge concluded that
Edwards had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and
then questioned Edwards about matters of state law. 69 Edwards
correctly answered questions about voir dire, and described the basic
framework for admitting videotape evidence at trial. 70 However,
Edwards was unable to answer questions regarding state evidentiary
rules, which the judge only identified by the rule number while
questioning Edwards. 71 Edwards continued to request to proceed pro se,
but because the court refused Edwards’s request for a continuance,
Edwards subsequently proceeded to trial represented by appointed
counsel. 72 Edwards was convicted of criminal recklessness and theft,
but the jury could not reach a verdict on the attempted murder and
battery with a deadly weapon charges. 73
The State retried Edwards on the attempted murder and battery
charges. Edwards again petitioned the trial court to proceed pro se. 74
Edwards explained to the court that he wished to proceed pro se because
he and his attorney disagreed about the proper defense for the attempted
murder charge. 75 Edwards wished to assert self-defense, while his
attorney wanted to present a lack of intent defense. 76 Edwards
explained, “my objection is me and my attorney actually had discussed a
defense, I think prosecution had mentioned that, and we are in
disagreement with it. He has a defense and I have a defense that I would
like to represent or present to the Judge.” 77 The court denied his
request. 78 Citing Edwards’s psychiatric reports, the court determined
Edwards still suffered from schizophrenia and held “[w]ith these
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 2389 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. 2382 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2389 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2389–90.
Id. at 2382 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2390 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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findings, he’s competent to stand trial but I’m not going to find he’s
competent to defend himself.” 79 Edwards was represented by appointed
counsel and was convicted on both the attempted murder and battery
charges. 80
Edwards appealed the trial court decisions, arguing that the trial
court’s refusal to allow him to proceed as a pro se litigant deprived him
of his constitutional right of self-representation. 81 The state appellate
court agreed and ordered a new trial. The Indiana Supreme Court then
held that the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedents, namely Faretta and
Godinez, required the court to allow Edwards to proceed as a pro se
litigant. 82
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court
acknowledged that its precedents, namely the opinions in Faretta,
Dusky, Drope, and especially Godinez, framed the issue presented, but
did not directly answer the question posed by the Indiana Supreme
Court. 83 In an opinion by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court answered
the question regarding whether the Constitution permits a state to limit a
defendant’s self-representation right by insisting upon representation by
counsel at trial—“on the ground that the defendant lacks the mental
capacity to conduct his trial defense unless represented” 84 —assuming
that (1) a criminal defendant has sufficient mental competence to stand
trial (i.e., the defendant meets the Dusky standard), and that (2) the
defendant insists on representing himself during the trial. 85 The
Edwards Court ultimately held that “the Constitution permits States to
insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to
stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to
the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by
themselves,” thus creating a distinct competency standard. 86
The Edwards Court premised its holding on three separate factors: (1)
Supreme Court precedent in regard to mental competency, (2) the
premise that mental illness is not a unitary concept, and (3) the necessity
to “‘affirm the dignity’ of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to
conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel.” 87 Each of these
three separate rationales is briefly discussed below.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 2382–83 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2383.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2382–85.
Id. at 2385–86.
Id. at 2385.
Id. at 2388.
Id. at 2386–87.
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The first rationale in support of the Court’s holding is that, although
the Court’s precedent does not directly answer the question presented,
the Court’s precedent tends to support the Edwards decision. 88 The
Court reasoned that its prior mental competence standards developed in
Dusky, Drope, and Godinez assume the necessity of representation by
counsel and emphasize the importance of counsel. 89 The Edwards Court
further reasoned these prior decisions suggest, although do not hold, that
“an instance in which a defendant who would choose to forgo counsel at
trial presents a very different set of circumstances, [and therefore] calls
for a different standard.” 90
The second rationale in support of the Edwards Court’s distinct
standard is the Court’s belief that mental illness is not a “unitary
concept,” i.e. assessing the competency of offenders with a mental
illness is not a unitary concept. 91 The Edwards Court acknowledged
that in certain circumstances a defendant may be able to satisfy the
Dusky mental competency standard, yet at the same time the defendant
may be unable to carry out the basic tasks necessary to present a defense
without the assistance of counsel. 92 The Court reasoned that because
mental illness is not a unitary concept and varies in degree, a single
mental competency standard for deciding both (1) whether a defendant
who is represented by counsel can proceed to trial and (2) whether a
defendant who goes to trial must be permitted to represent himself, was
unworkable. 93
The Edwards Court’s third rationale was that a right of selfrepresentation at trial will not “affirm the dignity” of a defendant who
lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance
of counsel. 94 Finding support from its holding in McKaskle v.
Wiggins, 95 the Court reasoned that “dignity” and “autonomy” of the
individual underlie the self-representation right. 96 Drawing on its
second rationale, the Court stated that given a defendant’s uncertain
mental state, “the spectacle that could well result from his selfrepresentation at trial is at least as likely to prove humiliating as
ennobling.” 97 The Court further reasoned that insofar as a defendant’s
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 2386.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2387.
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176–77 (1984).
Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2387.
Id. at 2387.
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lack of capacity threatens an improper conviction or sentence, selfrepresentation “undercuts the most basic of the Constitution’s criminal
law objectives, providing a fair trial.” 98
Ultimately, the Edwards Court determined that the Dusky basic
mental competence standard, which was also applied in Godinez, was
insufficient to address a defendant’s competency to proceed pro se. 99
IV. THE STANDARD ESTABLISHED IN INDIANA V. EDWARDS
Although the Supreme Court held that a distinct standard of
competency applies for determining a defendant’s competency to
proceed pro se, the Edwards Court declined to provide clear guidelines
regarding what the distinct standard is, or how the distinct standard
should be applied. 100 The American Bar Association, Standard 6–3.6,
entitled “The Defendant’s Election to Represent Himself or Herself at
Trial,” sets forth three factors that the trial judge should consider in
determining whether a defendant should be allowed to proceed without
the assistance of counsel: (1) the defendant has been clearly advised of
the right to the assistance of counsel, including the right to the
assignment of counsel when the defendant is so entitled; (2) the
defendant is capable of understanding the proceedings; and (3) the
defendant has made an intelligent and voluntary waiver of the right to
counsel. 101
Part IV of this Comment explores the distinct pro se competency
standard established in Edwards, and argues that regardless of whether a
distinct standard exists, competency to proceed pro se should and can be
a restorable right.
A. After Edwards, What Is the Standard for Competency to Represent
Oneself?
In Edwards, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution supports a
higher competency standard for proceeding pro se than for proceeding to
trial with counsel—thus creating a distinct competency standard.
However, the Edwards Court did not endorse Indiana’s proposed
standard for self-representation competency, and, as previously
mentioned, the Edwards Court did not set forth its own standard for self98. Id.
99. Id. at 2387–88.
100. See generally id. at 2379.
101. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE
TRIAL JUDGE § 6-3.6 (3d ed. 2000).
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representation competency. 102
1. The Supreme Court’s Floor and Ceiling
In Edwards, the Supreme Court effectively offered a floor and a
ceiling for creating a standard of self-representation competency. The
Edwards Court’s holding reflected the “floor” for a standard of selfrepresentation competency—the standard for self-representation
competency is higher than the Dusky standard—as the Edwards Court
held that “the Constitution permits States to insist upon representation
by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but
who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are
not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.” 103
By striking down Indiana’s proposed standard, the Edwards Court
also created the “ceiling” for a standard of self-representation
competency. Indiana asked the Court to adopt a more specific standard
that would “deny a criminal defendant the right to represent himself at
trial where the defendant cannot communicate coherently with the court
or a jury.” 104 The Edwards Court declined to adopt Indiana’s
“communicate coherently” standard for evaluating self-representation
competency as the Edwards Court was uncertain how the standard
would work in practice. 105
Therefore, although the Edwards Court declined to provide a specific
standard for evaluating self-representation competency, the Edwards
Court did provide a floor and a ceiling. The Court’s standard for selfrepresentation competency is higher than the Dusky standard, but lower
than (or different from) Indiana’s proposed “communicate coherently”
standard.
2. Can a Workable Standard Be Reached?—Subjective vs. Objective
Application
There seems to be a prevalent distaste for defendants, especially
criminal defendants, who elect to proceed pro se. This distaste is
reflected in both Justice Blackmun’s Faretta dissent and in the old
adage, “[o]ne who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client.” 106
However, empirical data has shown that pro se defendants fair no worse
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2387–88.
Id. at 2388.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 852 (1975).
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than defendants represented by counsel, and in some cases actually fair
better. 107 This data lends itself to support the notion that a workable
restorable right model can be achieved for defendants with a mental
illness that elect to proceed pro se—especially if the restorable right
model is implemented on a case-by-case basis. A subjective application
of the restorable right model would also adhere to the Edwards Court’s
observation that evaluating the competency of defendants with a mental
illness is not a “unitary concept.” 108 Additionally, a subjective case-bycase review of defendants with mental illness who wish to proceed pro
se would not overburden the court as the rate of self-represented litigants
is roughly 0.3 to 0.5%. 109
B. Can Competency to Represent Oneself Be Restored?
When a defendant is found incompetent to stand trial or incompetent
to plea, 110 the court actively tries to restore the defendant’s competency
so that the pending criminal process can proceed. However, under
Edwards, when a defendant is found incompetent to proceed as a pro se
litigant, instead of attempting to restore the defendant to an active state
of competency, the court instead forces counsel upon the defendant—
ostracizing the defendant from conducting his or her own defense. In
the subpart below, this Comment argues that the holding in Sell v.
United States 111 should also apply in seeking to restore competency in
defendants that desire to proceed pro se.
1. Restoring a Defendant’s Competency to Proceed Pro Se Through
Medication
The liberty interest grounded in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution extends defendants the right to refuse
psychotropic medications. 112 However, this liberty interest is not

107. Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the
Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 447–55 (2007). For a concise breakdown of the data on
felony pro se defendants in state and federal court, see Table 1 and Table 2, located within Ms.
Hashimoto’s article. Id.
108. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2386.
109. See Hashimoto, supra note 107, at 447. These percentages reflect felony pro se defendants
pulled from the Federal Court Database and the State Court Database at the time of the study. Id.
110. Both of these competency standards are the same; the applicable standard is the Dusky
standard.
111. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
112. Id. See also Vinneth Carvalho, Involuntary Medication Administration Standards for
Restoring Competency to Stand Trial, J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW, Mar. 2006.
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absolute. In Sell v. United States, the Supreme Court developed the
four-factor “Sell Test.” 113 Involuntary administration of drugs, solely
for trial competency purposes, is permitted if the four specific criteria
laid out in the Sell Test are met: (1) that “important governmental
interests are at stake” in trying the defendant; (2) that involuntary
medication will “significantly further” this interest; (3) that involuntary
medication is “necessary” to further the government’s interests; and (4)
that the administration of the medication is “medically appropriate,” or
that it is in the defendant’s “best interest in light of his medical
problems.” 114
In the case of defendants who desire to proceed pro se, but are found
by the court to be incompetent to do so, then arguably the spirit of the
Sell Test should also apply to those defendants. Under the holding in
Sell, defendants should be permitted to elect to take psychotropic
medication in order to be restored to competency to proceed pro se, just
as defendants are involuntarily forced to take medication in order to be
restored to trial competency.
For example, if a defendant in a criminal proceeding elected to
proceed pro se, but under the Edwards standard was found incompetent
to do so, instead of automatically having counsel forced upon her, the
defendant could choose to take medication in an attempt to restore her
competency to proceed pro se. Applying the Sell Test with the
defendant’s interests at the center of the analysis—instead of the
government’s interests—a defendant may be permitted to take
medication to restore her competency to proceed pro se if the four
factors are met. Therefore, the first Sell factor is met because the
defendant’s liberty interest and interest in presenting her own defense
meets the “important interests at stake” analysis. The second factor, that
medication will “significantly further” this interest, is most likely met
upon a determination and medical evaluation by a psychiatrist or other
mental health professional that the medication is appropriate for treating
the defendant’s mental illness or defect, and will most likely restore the
defendant to a state of competency if the medication is taken as
prescribed. The third factor, that medication is “necessary” to further
the defendant’s interests, is met if, as a reflection of the second factor,
the mental health professional finds as a result of the evaluation that the
defendant cannot be restored to competency without the assistance of
psychotropic medications in order to be restored to competency to
proceed as a pro se litigant. And finally, the fourth factor, the

113. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180–82.
114. Id. See also Carvalho, supra note 112.
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administration of the medication is “medically appropriate,” or that the
medication is in the defendant’s “best interest in light of his medical
problems,” is again a reflection of the result of the mental health
professional’s evaluation of the defendant—if the defendant is found to
have a treatable mental illness, such as schizophrenia or a delusional
disorder, then medication is most likely medically appropriate to restore
the defendant to a state of competency to proceed pro se. If on the other
hand, the defendant is found to suffer from serious mental retardation,
which under any amount or type of medication is not treatable, then
medication is not appropriate or in the best interests of the defendant
because medication is unlikely to restore the defendant to a state of
competency to proceed pro se. 115
2. How Much Time Should the Defendant Be Allotted to Be Restored to
Competency to Proceed Pro Se—Drawing Analogies from Competency
in Other Criminal Justice Proceedings
In other legal realms of competency evaluations, there is typically a
standard, statutorily imposed time limit in which the defendant must be
restored to the required level of competency. As an example,
competency to stand trial (CST) imposes such a limit. 116 If the
defendant is not restored to CST within this time limit, then the
defendant is usually civilly committed. 117 Under a restorable right
model, this Comment offers that a similar statutorily constructed time
limit may be imposed for self-representation competency to be restored.
If at the end of the statutorily imposed time limit the defendant remained
incompetent to proceed pro se, the defendant would have counsel
appointed to assist in her defense (assuming that the defendant is
competent to stand trial).
C. Procedural Safeguards and Determinations
This subpart suggests various procedural safeguards and
determinations from third party professionals that can be put in place to
dissuade the notion that “[n]o trial can be fair that leaves the defense to a
115. However, medication may be appropriate for other purposes.
116. See generally Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). Jackson enforced a
reasonableness limit: due process dictates that commitment for competence restoration treatment last no
longer than “the reasonable period of time” needed to determine whether there exists a substantial
probability of attaining competence in the foreseeable future. Id.
117. Id. Once a court finds that restoration is not substantially probable, the “[s]tate must either
institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any
other citizen, or release the defendant.” Id.
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man who is insane, unaided by counsel, and who by reason of his mental
condition stands helpless and alone before the court,” 118 and to work to
ensure that competency to proceed pro se can be a restorable right of the
defendant in many instances.
1. Involvement of the Court
The Edwards Court proffered that the trial judge “will often prove
best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to
the individualized circumstances of a particular defendant.”119
However, especially in the case of Edwards, in which the same trial
judge presided over one of his competency hearings and his two
trials, 120 the risk of prejudice and bias on behalf of the trial judge in
evaluating the competency of a defendant to proceed pro se is fairly
substantial. Although the trial judge may be intimately familiar with the
facts of the case and the legal proceedings, the trial judge may not be the
best person to objectively and fairly evaluate the defendant’s
competency to proceed in a pro se capacity, especially because in most
instances the trial judge will have little to no mental health or medical
training.
In order to reach a workable standard for evaluating selfrepresentation competency and for self-representation to be recognized
as a restorable right, it is important to look to other legal competency
evaluations for insight. The subpart below discusses the role mental
health professionals should play in creating a workable standard for selfrepresentation competency.
2. Involvement of Mental Health Professionals
Drawing analogies from other legal competency evaluations, such as
CST evaluations and competency to plead evaluations, this Comment
argues that mental health professionals should play a more involved role
in creating a workable standard for competency to self-representation,
and in evaluating self-representation as a restorable right. Instead of the
trial judge as the primary evaluator of the defendant’s competency, as
suggested by the Edwards Court, a neutral third party mental health
provider may be in a better position to objectively evaluate the
defendant’s competency to proceed pro se as well as to make
118. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387 (2008) (quoting Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105,
108 (1954)).
119. Id.
120. Id.
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recommendations regarding whether the defendant has the potential to
be restored to competency through medication or other means.
The concept of a third party mental health professional evaluating the
competency of defendants is not a new concept—it is the practice
followed in CST and competency to plead evaluations. 121 For example,
if a defendant files a motion with the court to proceed pro se, but after
questioning, the trial judge elects not to accept the defendant’s waiver of
counsel, under a restorable right standard of self-representation
competency, the trial judge would then refer the defendant to a third
party mental health professional for a competency evaluation. The
mental health professional would evaluate the defendant and would offer
recommendations to the court regarding whether the defendant was
competent to proceed pro se. If the mental health professional
determined that the defendant was incompetent to proceed pro se, the
defendant could choose to have counsel appointed. Alternatively, under
a restorable right model, the defendant could attempt to be restored to
competency to proceed pro se by taking medication, and after a set
period of time, undergo another evaluation by the mental health
professional to determine if the defendant had been restored to
competency to proceed pro se. The mental health professionals would
thus play a more pivotal role than the Edwards Court originally
suggested. This increased role would provide a more objective and fair
medical evaluation of the defendant in determining competency to
proceed pro se.
3. Appointment of Standby Counsel
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[o]ne might not be insane in
the sense of being incapable of standing trial and yet lack the capacity to
stand trial without benefit of counsel.” 122 However, in McKaskle v.
Wiggins, 123 the Supreme Court reached a workable compromise with the
concept of appointment of standby counsel. The concept of standby
counsel is highly applicable and is a viable safeguard option for the
court in permitting a defendant to proceed pro se. This is especially true
for a defendant whose competency to proceed pro se has been
challenged, or whose competency to proceed pro se has been restored
through medication or other methods.

121. See generally THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND
INSTRUMENTS (2d ed. 2003).
122. Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954).
123. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
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In Wiggins, the Court recognized that:
A defendant’s right to self-representation plainly encompasses certain
specific rights to have his voice heard. The pro se defendant must be
allowed to control the organization and content of his own defense, to
make motions, to argue points of law, to participate in voir dire, to
question witnesses, and to address the court and the jury at appropriate
points in the trial. 124

Recognizing that the right to appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity
and autonomy of the accused, and to allow the presentation of what may,
at least occasionally, be the accused defendant’s best possible defense,
the Wiggins Court held that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are
not violated through the appointment of standby counsel. 125 Standby
counsel may be necessary to “relieve the judge of the need to explain
and enforce basic rules of courtroom protocol or to assist the defendant
in overcoming routine obstacles that stand in the way of the defendant’s
achievement of his own clearly indicated goals.” 126 The Wiggins Court
further held that standby counsel’s participation in the basic procedures
of the trial was permissible even if it somewhat undermined the pro se
defendant’s appearance of control over the proceedings. 127
The Wiggins Court emphasized that the primary focus of the
permissibility of standby counsel must be “on whether the defendant had
a fair chance to present his case in his own way.” 128 In the case of a
defendant who has been restored to competency to proceed pro se,
requiring mandatory appointment of standby counsel to assist the pro se
defendant is a viable and workable safeguard to assure the dignity of the
defendant and to assure that the decorum of the trial proceedings are
observed. Although the mandatory appointment of standby counsel for
such defendants would incur additional costs for the court and the
community, overall, it seems a small price to pay in order to uphold the
constitutional rights of the defendant.
Additionally, given that self-representation in criminal proceedings is
a constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment, the “tools” necessary
to restore that right, i.e. medication and appointment of standby counsel,
may fall within the purview of the Ake v. Oklahoma holding, especially
if the defendant is an indigent defendant. 129 In Ake, the Court held that
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 174.
Id. at 184.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 174.
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). The discussion in this Comment focuses exclusively
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“meaningful access to justice” for indigent clients is important in
ensuring the fairness of trial proceedings. 130 To implement this
principle, the Court in Ake and other past cases focused on identifying
the “basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal.” 131
Although Ake specifically addressed psychiatric evaluations as a
“basic tool,” the Ake analysis could possibly be extended to other
contexts, including self-representation as a restorable right, in order to
cover the costs of medication and standby counsel for indigent clients
who elected to attempt to be restored to competency so that they could
proceed pro se. Ake identified three factors to be considered in
determining whether something was a “basic tool of an adequate defense
or appeal”: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the action of
the state; (2) the governmental interest that will be affected if the
safeguard is to be provided; and (3) the probable value of the additional
or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, along with the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards are
not provided. 132
Applying the Ake analysis to whether medication and standby counsel
are “basic tools” for the prospective restorable right pro se litigant
model, one reaches the following conclusions: (1) The defendant’s
liberty interest and interest in presenting his or her own defense are
compelling interests. (2) Providing medication to the defendant is
unlikely to place an additional burden on the state. If the defendant
could be restored to competency for self-representation with medication,
then most likely the defendant will also need to take medication to meet
the CST standard, or at the very least will need medication to improve
her daily quality of life. Additionally, standby counsel is often assigned
by the court when a competent defendant elects to proceed pro se, so the
recommendation of mandatory standby counsel is unlikely to create an
additional burden on the state. (3) Following the rationale of the second
factor, providing the defendant with medication and standby counsel is
unlikely to place additional financial burdens on the state. Additionally,
as self-representation is a constitutional right, denying the defendant the
right to present his or her own defense presents a great risk of erroneous
constitutional deprivation to the defendant if the safeguards are not
provided by the state. 133
on indigent clients. Presumably, if a defendant is not indigent, the defendant would bear the burden of
costs of medication and standby counsel as in other legal settings where the defendant is not indigent.
130. Id. at 77.
131. Id. (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)).
132. Id.
133. See Appendix A, Examples of Trial Scenarios, for a more detailed evaluation of the estorable
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V. CONCLUSION
Lest the citizenry lose faith in the substance of the system and the
procedures we use to administer it, we can ill afford to confront them with
a government dominated by forms and mysterious rituals and then tell
them they lose because they did not know how to play the game or should
not have taken us at our word. 134

Self-representation in criminal proceedings is a defendant’s
fundamental, constitutional right. Instead of asking “[H]ow in the world
can our legal system allow an insane man to defend himself?,” 135 this
Comment argued that the Court should adopt a workable standard that
acknowledges competency to proceed pro se as a restorable right of the
defendant. This Comment demonstrated that a workable standard can be
reached, in which defendants who elect to proceed pro se and who also
have mental capacity concerns, are evaluated on a case-by-case basis by
a third party mental health professional. This process, along with the
additional procedural safeguard of mandatory appointment of standby
counsel, will ensure the dignity of the defendant and the decorum of the
trial proceedings will be honored. Additionally, this process will strike a
workable balance between the fundamental liberty interests of
defendants in presenting their own defense, and the government’s
interest in assuring the fairness of the trial proceedings. Anything less
would be unconstitutional.

right model.
134. Moore v. Price, 914 S.W.2d 318, 323 (Ark. 1996) (Mayfield, J., dissenting) (quoting
Teegarden v. Dir., Ark. Emp’t Sec. Div. (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (Newbern, J., dissenting)).
135. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387 (2008) (quoting the Brief of Ohio et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 24, Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008) (No. 07-208) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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Appendix A: Examples of Trial Scenarios
Pro Se Defendant
Without Mental
Capacity Concerns
◦Defendant files
motion to proceed
pro se.

Edwards Court Pro
Se Model

Restorable Right
Model

◦Defendant files
motion to proceed pro
se.

◦Defendant files motion
to proceed pro se.
◦Court orders CST
evaluation.

◦Defendant
knowingly and
voluntarily waives
the right to counsel.

◦Defendant
knowingly and
voluntarily waives the ◦Defendant is found
CST.
right to counsel.

◦Court accepts the
waiver.

◦Court declines the
waiver.

◦Defendant is CST.

◦Defendant is CST,
but is found
incompetent to
proceed pro se.

◦Defendant proceeds
pro se.

◦The trial judge
rejects the
defendant’s motion to
proceed pro se and
appoints counsel to
represent the
defendant.

◦However, court rejects
defendant’s motion to
proceed pro se, finding
defendant has not
knowingly and
voluntarily waived the
right to counsel because
of the presence of a
mental illness/defect.
◦Defendant undergoes
separate evaluation by
third party mental
health (MH)
professional.
◦MH professional finds
defendant competent to
proceed pro se.
◦Defendant elects to
take medication to
restore selfrepresentation
competency.
◦Defendant is reevaluated after a period
of time.
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◦MH professional finds
defendant competent to
conduct his or her own
defense.
◦Trial judge accepts
recommendation of
MH professional and
accepts the defendant’s
waiver of counsel as
satisfying the Zerbst
standard.
◦Court issues
mandatory appointment
of standby counsel.
◦Defendant proceeds pro
se and conducts his or
her own defense with the
assistance of standby
counsel.
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